pp. 65-88
The Bargaining Chip and SALT
Robert J. Bresler and Robert C. Gray subject the concept of the "bargaining chip" in arms negotiation to critical scrutiny. After analyzing the rationales for a number of weapon systems, they find that no coherent bargaining chip policy has existed among high American officialdom.
Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning, Colin S. Gray Reviewed by Robert J. Bresler
Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game, Arthur Macy Cox and Georgy Arbatov Reviewed by Robert C. Gray
MX: Prescription for Disaster, Herbert Scoville Reviewed by Robert J. Bresler
The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976, Michael Mandelbaum Reviewed by Robert J. Bresler
Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, Strobe Talbott Reviewed by Robert C. Gray
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