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475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274
(212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@psqonline.org · <http://www.psqonline.org>

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Smith begins by reviewing basic constitutional principles, including ideals from the Enlightenment that sought to avoid war and its calamitous effects on citizens. Acknowledging the right of self-defense, Enlightenment libertarian principles also looked with suspicion on the monarchical appetite for initiating war to satisfy fame and personal glory. A republican government relying on the consent of the people would embark on war with much greater caution and circumspection. James Madison and other Framers drew from these Enlightenment principles, insisting that a crucial check on the president's power to make war was unlimited debate by citizens. The free-press clause in the First Amendment was meant to safeguard this right of citizens.

In chapters that cover the presidencies from George Washington to Bill Clinton, Smith lays out a detailed accounting of how personal attitudes and bureaucratic structures affect the dissemination of information. Of special interest is the relatively open policy of General Dwight D. Eisenhower during World War II, even to the extent of allowing press coverage of racial incidents between white and black American soldiers. He told a reporter, "to go wherever he wanted, whenever he wanted," so there would be no suspicion of covering up "error and stupidity" (p. 213).

General William Westmoreland, Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon blamed the media in large part for the outcome of the Vietnam War (pp. 198–200). As a counterbalance to such claims, Smith cites a study by William M. Hammond, who concluded that the public turned against the war not so much because of media coverage but because of mounting casualties, the administration's ineffective war strategy, and the perception of dissembling by executive officials. Despite these lessons from the media's role in Vietnam, officials in the Reagan administration decided in 1983 to keep the media out of Grenada, and in 1991 the Bush administration severely limited the circulation of videos and photographs of combat activity in the Gulf War.

In the concluding chapter, Smith reviews some of the basic principles that govern press freedom in wartime. A Defense Department policy released after the Gulf War stated that information should not be withheld "to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment" but could be withheld "only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces." The military wanted to review draft stories before their release, but media representatives objected that this procedure would be unwarranted and unnecessary (pp. 226–27). Smith argues persuasively that whatever the risks of press freedom in time of war, the far greater risk is allowing unsound and futile military policies to continue unchecked and unexposed. He ends with this advice from Benjamin Franklin: "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

Democratic Politics in Latin America and the Caribbean by Jorge I. Domínguez. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 253 pp. Cloth, \$48.00; paper, \$16.95.

"The record is good enough," concludes Jorge I. Domínguez (p. 214). Six previously published chapters on the Caribbean, Central America and Panama, the institutions of democracies, ideas and leaders, Mexican political culture, and Cuba in the 1990s are framed by

an introduction and a conclusion written for this volume. Domínguez's critical portrait of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean crosses the academic and political divide: students and practitioners (or aspirants) of democracy are unlikely to find a more compelling collection; Left and Right lose their traditional import as the gamut of democracy consolidates.

"Politicians talk, argue, and disagree. That is what they should do. The alternative is abuse and imposition without consultation or participation" (p. 214). Therein lies the democratic advantage: political institutions and cultures that allow for the periodical consent or rejection of leaders and goals by the citizenry. Bad as it may often be, democracy shines in comparison with other forms of government. Domínguez offers a wide spectrum of evidence from the recent past that permits a cautious optimism. Constructing democracies, not their breakdown nor their authoritarian alternatives, is his concern. The anthology itself is hopeful testimony: two decades ago democratic politics could not have served as a topical compass for essays on Latin America and the Caribbean.

The collection's strengths lie in the synthesis of the literature in view of the regional experiences. Thus, the well established theoretical and practical dictum—constructing certainties (assurances) are imperative for key actors to risk the uncertainties (contingencies) of democracies—finds repeated, vigorous exposition. The Anglophone Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and the post-1978 Dominican Republic illustrate the longer-term interactions between incumbents and opponents (chapter 1). El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala offer more recent examples of the choices made by regimes and their armed oppositions to end a state of war (chapter 2). A negative case is Cuba, where under Fidel Castro's leadership, political elites have postponed their day of reckoning: bargaining for assurances so that they may entertain the possibility of yielding power (chapter 6).

Domínguez, in his words, names names: leaders matter, for better or for worse. Castro's incontestable presence undoubtedly marked the choices made—and the alternatives discarded—as the early 1990s befell the Cuban government. Stellar statesmanship—at least of the kind democracies need—has surely strengthened democracy in the English-speaking Caribbean and in Puerto Rico: politicians have acknowledged defeat (the Jamaicans' Michael Manley in 1980 and Edward Seaga in 1989) or have known when to leave (Puerto Rico's Luis Muñoz Marín in 1964). Most impressive are the technopols—politicians with expertise or experts with political savvy—who are the subject of chapter 4: Brazil's Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Argentina's Domingo Cavallo, Mexico's Pedro Aspe, and the Chileans, Evelyn Matthei and Alejandro Foxley. In varying official capacities, each has taken ideas seriously and used them to act politically in pursuit of democracy and market reforms.

Not all is well, of course. In chapter 3 (coauthored with Jeanne Kinney Giraldo), Domínguez meticulously overviews political parties, institutional reforms, and state-market relations. Many Latin Americans have shown great capacity to organize themselves peacefully to participate in politics, but constitutional government has fallen short of democracy's needs. Mexicans manifest attitudes that are far more democratic than the behavior of their leaders or the functioning of the political system (chapter 5 with James A. McCann). Corruption and poverty have remained, in some cases worsened, in the transition to open politics and freer markets. But Domínguez is right: the record is good enough to hope that democratic governance will be improved.

MARIFELI PÉREZ-STABLE
State University of New York
College at Old Westbury