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during a period of divided government. During the 1897–1954 period, only two of thirty-six nominations were made during a period of divided government compared to fifteen of thirty-one nominations during the 1954–1994 period.

Although some scholars (including Michael Comiskey) and journalists have a generally positive view of the process that now characterizes confirmation of Supreme Court nominees, others are critical. Adherents of the legalist school, for example, favor a less political and less sensational confirmation process that focuses more on the nominee's legal credentials and less on his or her political and constitutional ideologies. Even those who generally support the current process (the political school) sometimes express concerns about the Senate's inability to really determine a nominee's beliefs on legal issues.

Throughout the book's eight chapters, readers will find an in-depth analysis of these two competing critiques of the confirmation process. In the final analysis, the author rejects the legalist model almost entirely and concludes that "the political school correctly advocates an active role for the Senate" (p. 185). While no one will agree with all of Michael Comiskey's conclusions, there is no doubt that his book will inform the debate on the confirmation of Supreme Court nominations for years to come.

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**Gulliver Unbound: America's Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq**
*by Stanley Hoffmann with Frédéric Bozo. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004. 168 pp. $19.95.*

Stanley Hoffmann has long been one of the academy's most insightful observers of both French and American politics, and he is thus uniquely qualified in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War to explain the United States to French audiences puzzled by the "hyperpower" and to explain France to American audiences so incensed as to rename their favorite "vegetable" the "freedom fry." This little book, conceived and presented largely as a series of conversations between Hoffmann and a French former student, does not disappoint.

For those familiar with the Hoffmann corpus, the book's title will resonate. Nearly forty years ago, as Vietnam weighed heavily on the American scene, Hoffmann published an influential—if today all too rarely read—cultural analysis of American foreign policy under the title *Gulliver's Troubles; or, The Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). Many of Hoffmann's observations have withstood the test of time, and they are here applied with renewed vigor.

Not surprisingly, the most satisfying discussions in this book come as Hoffmann skillfully locates the grand strategic vision of President George W. Bush's administration within the "exceptionalist" foreign policy tradition. As others too have noted, Bush and his advisers are the latest in a long line of American statesmen who have asserted that the particular (that is, American values) is

universal, who have declared that the world must be made safe for democracy, and who have cleverly framed interests in the language of these allegedly universal ideals. Yet, Hoffmann maintains, there has been a "rupture," for "what is new today is that exceptionalism is almost exclusively based on military power" (p. 21). Hoffmann thus rightly sees the Bush administration's neoconservative foreign policy as an unwieldy (and perhaps ultimately ill-fated) marriage between a militant Wilsonian idealism and a tough-minded militaristic realism. September 11 was, then, a "divine surprise" (pp. 33–49)—a terrible "gift" that opened space for the pursuit of a grand, ill-considered agenda.

The bulk of the book focuses on the Iraq War and its aftermath, particularly the "crisis" in Franco–American relations. In Hoffmann's view, the Bush administration was set on war with Iraq by the summer of 2002, and Bush's submission to the United Nations that September was a sham. Although Hoffmann acknowledges French tactical missteps, he takes French objections at face value. Nowhere does he concede that French opposition was driven, at least in part, by France's desire to undermine the "hyperpower" and its aspirations for global empire. Hoffmann treats those instances in which French leaders gave voice to counterbalancing impulses as cases of misguided rhetoric, but they were, perhaps more plausibly, revealing slips of the tongue. Frédéric Bozo gently suggests that Hoffmann is "overly indulgent toward French policy" (p. 14), and, indeed, Hoffmann's otherwise perceptive analysis is marred by a seeming need to beatify the opponents of the administration "barbarians" (p. 3) who worship the "cult of force" (p. 46). Hoffmann correctly accuses President Bush of fostering a Manichean view of the world, but he, too, can be faulted for falling into the convenient tropes of the Western, though with France now playing the role of the white-hatted cowboy.

Hoffmann's criticism of the Bush administration's arrogance, of its misguided quest for empire, and of its contempt for other views is today quite familiar. Yet these familiar arguments are often elegantly put, and Hoffmann's writing, even in this unusual format, sparkles as ever. Moreover, Hoffmann remains a wise and humane observer of international affairs in an age all too lacking in both wisdom and humanity. He is eloquent in making the case for international norms and institutions that would impart a measure of order to international politics and forestall Hobbesian anarchy.

Stanley Hoffmann's is a powerful liberal voice in a post–September 11 America that has too often seemed bereft of such voices. In his conclusion, he briefly limns a foreign policy based on "true partnership" rather than "ultimate command" (pp. 142–143). Had Hoffmann expanded on these themes, neoconservatives would have found themselves with a formidable sparring partner. This reviewer hopes that Hoffmann will take up the challenge.

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