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475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274

(212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@psqonline.org · http://www.psqonline.org

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ping losses in World War I, they would have pressed for a change much earlier and more insistently than they did. (The value of nonevents is something that most scholars realize but few act upon.)

There are some problems, however. On occasion, Gartner oversimplifies. Thus the claim that members of Congress reacted so strongly to the Tet offensive because the indicator they were tracking was American casualties downplays the extent to which they interpreted this event against the background of claims that the American forces had broken the back of the enemy. He also fails to discuss anomalies such as Robert McNamara's coming to believe that the United States could not win the war before the body count pointed to defeat. More importantly, the study should have been shorter or longer. Little would have been lost in compressing it into a lengthy article. Even better, the book could have been made more convincing by more detailed historical analysis. By only looking at the standard secondary sources, Gartner is not able to demonstrate convincingly what information was in fact most influential. Research in primary sources and a more textured narrative might have revealed several smoking guns, as well as raised interesting questions. Thus he presents graphs showing changes on what he argues were the dominant indicators, but does not reproduce the graphs the decision makers themselves received. More extended treatment could also have included discussion of the crucial question of what determines the indicators that organizations select.

In summary, this is an interesting book that could have been even better.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991–95 *by Wayne Bert. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997. 296 pp. $35.00.*

This book is one of the first to focus exclusively on U.S. policy toward Bosnia. Although many popular and scholarly articles have been written on the topic, the author provides a valuable service by distilling the debates into one readable volume.

The author's main argument is that the United States had no compelling security interest in Bosnia, but did have strong humanitarian interests. Given this fact, U.S. public opinion and elite attitudes toward Bosnia were split. While most supported the goal of a united, independent, and multi-ethnic Bosnia, many refused to support the use of force to thwart Bosnian Serb territorial gains. As a result, U.S. policy foundered, settling on the worst possible alternative: U.S. administrations torpedoed European-brokered peace plans, arguing they rewarded Serb aggression, but refused to lead a military campaign to impose a different solution. In 1995 Bill Clinton finally switched tactics, enforcing a settlement through air assaults on Bosnian Serbs and through support for Bosnian and Croat military offensives. The United States could have stopped the war much earlier, the author argues, had it been willing to try air strikes at the beginning of hostilities. A determined and self-confident president could have mobilized domestic support had he been willing to risk failure.

One of the book's most important contributions is its effective refutation of the all-or-nothing doctrine prevalent in the United States following the Gulf War. This policy, the author argues, is little more than a recipe for helplessness and inaction, since few foreign

policy challenges will justify a massive, all-out U.S. effort. A second crucial contribution is the evidence demonstrating that Bosnia splintered the U.S. policy-making elite along nontraditional lines. Conservatives and liberals found themselves on the same side of the fence, breaking with cold war-era coalitions. This account would have been strengthened, however, had the author analyzed this new domestic situation in greater depth. Which groups pushed which policies, when, and why? What interests, ideological or bureaucratic, were being served?

The book has several other problems. It is weak on Balkan affairs, offering a simplistic analysis of the Serb camp. It glosses over domestic challenges to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic's rule, erroneously portraying him as an all-powerful leader in full control of rump Yugoslavia as well as Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. The book thus loses sight of important regional differences between Serb entities as well as key internal struggles within Serbia proper between former communists and radical nationalists. Another drawback is the book's failure to fully discuss the effects of U.S. policy on Bosnian Muslim positions. The administration's anti-Serb rhetoric often provided false encouragement to the Bosnian leadership, complicating European efforts at finding a settlement.

Some of these weaknesses stem from the author's tendency, freely admitted, to see Serbia as the root cause of all Bosnia's difficulties. This analysis provides intellectual justification for the author's preference for U.S. air strikes against the Serbs. The text would have been stronger, however, had it retained its support for U.S. effectiveness while acknowledging important Bosnian complexities.

The author makes a rare, good-faith effort to deal with a particularly thorny question: Why, given the existence of far more terrible wars, should the United States focus on Bosnia? Why did the same wrenching debates not take place about Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and the Sudan? The answer—that the U.S. has historical interests in the Balkans—is unsatisfying, however, given the book's advocacy of an ethical foreign policy.

I recommend this work to generalists interested in U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold war era, as well as those with a more specific interest in the U.S. Bosnia policy. It should be used in courses on the Bosnian war only in combination with more nuanced studies, however, to avoid offering a simplified picture of the conflict.

JAMES RON
The Brookings Institution

Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress *by Barbara Sinclair. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. Cloth, $33.95; paper, $19.95.*

A gaping chasm exists between the legislative process observed on Capitol Hill and the legislative process described in U.S. government textbooks, argues Barbara Sinclair. Where the route to enactment used to be linear and predictable, now it is "flexible and varied" (p. 31). To this end the author explores new procedures and practices in the House and Senate, the factors that have contributed to their emergence, and their consequences for the lawmaking process and the legislation produced. She illustrates her analysis with several case studies. National service legislation, regulatory overhaul, and the omnibus drug bill highlight the variability of the contemporary legislative process. President Bill Clinton's economic program and the 1995 Republican budget demonstrate how the contemporary