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Nations Association, Luck is as well qualified as anyone to address the roots of this ambivalence. Using U.S. policy toward the United Nations as an exemplar of U.S. attitudes toward international organizations, Luck argues that eight core themes recur in the U.S. debate about involvement in the UN: American exceptionalism; the desire to protect national sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world; a fear of "others"; not wanting to be relegated to a minority position and given equal status with other states; the unwillingness to put American troops under international command; the inability to see how the UN furthers U.S. national interests; enduring questions about UN reform; and tensions over burden sharing and financing. Although Luck acknowledges that other states exhibit similar behavior, it is exaggerated in the American case because of its history, position in the international system, political culture, and a domestic political process that makes it easy to be critical of the UN and gives presidents little political incentive to defend it. The book is organized around these eight themes, and each chapter proceeds historically and attempts to demonstrate how these root causes play themselves out over time.

Luck somehow manages to write with both tremendous verve and analytic coolness. He deftly identifies many of the sources of U.S. ambivalence and shows how those sources shape U.S. policy. To substantiate his analytical claims, he carefully weighs the evidence and produces juicy anecdotes and statements from American politicians, sometimes to the point of nearly drowning out the points he wants to make. Yet as a longtime defender of the UN, Luck also cannot help but write with an eye toward convincing the naysayers of the folly of their positions; Luck is passionate without being polemical.

His objectivity shines through in the conclusion, when he provocatively calls for a domestic and international compact; the former would involve a discussion surrounding the necessity of the UN and what Americans are willing to do to maintain it, while the latter would involve a wide-ranging discussion among states concerning what sort of UN is desirable and politically feasible. Only after such a discussion, Luck concludes, will the United States be able to rid itself of its inconsistent policy, and member states will finally agree on what roles the UN should fulfill. However desirable such compacts might be, Luck himself acknowledges that the same factors that got the United States and the international community into this situation are likely to preclude such a debate. But in the event of the improbable debate, this book would be its primer.

MICHAEL BARNETT
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Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 *by David M. Kennedy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 940 pp. $39.95.*

At the turn of the century, the Great Depression and World War II still weigh heavily on the U.S. national consciousness. Discussions about a tax credit for

World War II veterans, a recent spate of World War II films, and current debates about Nazi and Japanese war atrocities attest to the lingering popularity and controversies of the "Good War." Likewise, the New Deal's achievements—the growth in the size and duties of the federal state, the expansion of the meaning of citizenship—have become heightened points of contention. David M. Kennedy's book, which recently won the Pulitzer Prize, is therefore well timed. The author's central argument is that the years 1929–1945 are best understood as a single period in which the U.S. economy made a transition from paralysis to prosperity, while statesmen extended a sense of "security" to the whole of society. In the process of waging another world war, policy makers also repudiated a century and a half of isolationism.

For Kennedy, professor of history at Stanford University, the notable aspect of this period was not the cold war that followed, but rather the advent of globalization. He states that "America's half-century-long ideological, political, and military face-off with the Soviet Union may appear far less consequential than America's leadership in inaugurating an era of global economic interdependence" (p. 855). In his arguments, Kennedy contributes to existing literature linking New Deal legislation to the unintended legacies of the Herbert Hoover administration. Like other historians on the subject, he argues that just as the Depression proved an ironic asset in mobilizing for war, the war itself highlighted how the state could promote economic growth. Kennedy concludes that the U.S. victory did not stem from exceptional American sacrifices (the Russian people suffered far more) but rather from American industry's ability to out-produce its enemies.

Like other volumes in the Oxford history series, this work is broad in scope, yet detailed and informative. The author's discussion of the Great Depression's causes is at once complex and accessible. Further, the chapters in which Kennedy restages the war are sure to appeal to military history readers. The book has a literary quality, and like a novel revolves around the characters of Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler, and Winston Churchill. Still, it is highly scholarly. While its length might hamper usage in the classroom, its subject matter and Kennedy's breezy writing style will secure a mass audience.

However, for a work claiming to be about the "American people," the book contains surprisingly little about them. Race and gender, for instance, are dealt with substantively in only one chapter, as is labor. This lack of social and cultural history may confirm for many such historians the dangers of grand narrative history. Social historians might also criticize as old-fashioned Kennedy's overemphasis on the various "great men" of the period and object to his almost exclusive focus on statecraft. In these respects, the book is a decidedly traditional political history.

Yet, unlike the consensus scholarship of the past, this work acknowledges the pervasive social conflicts and inequalities during depression and war. Similarly, Kennedy forthrightly discusses how anti-Japanese sentiments infused the Pacific war with a barbarism absent in the European theater. Details like these

weigh against the book's limitations and allow one to readily appreciate the truly magisterial work Kennedy has written.

CLARENCE LANG
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Rostenkowski: The Pursuit of Power and the End of the Old Politics *by Richard E. Cohen. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 1999. 311 pp. $27.50.*

Dan Rostenkowski's congressional career spanned the years from Speakers Sam Rayburn to Newt Gingrich, one of the most intense periods of political and institutional change in the history of Congress. This artfully crafted book by the *National Journal's* Richard E. Cohen combines a biographical account of Rostenkowski's rise from the tribal politics of Chicago's near northwest side to national prominence as chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, with a concise and readable political history of the unbroken forty-year period during which Democrats controlled the House. Both accounts draw on extensive interviewing, oral histories, and archival sources, as well as work on Congress by political scientists and other journalists. Both also strike a judicious balance, detailing legislative achievements as well as the excesses and ethical lapses that ultimately brought both Rostenkowski's political career and Democratic control of the House to an end in 1994.

The central paradox of Dan Rostenkowski's political career is that a product of the Chicago Democratic machine of the 1950s became such an important congressional figure during an era marked first by extensive political reform, and then by the ascendancy of independent, entrepreneurial politicians. Cohen's account argues convincingly that Rostenkowski's personal qualitites—his consistency, his tenacity, and especially his political skill—are critical in understanding why he never was far from the center of power throughout his congressional career and why he developed into one of the most important national legislators of the 1980s and 1990s—arguably of the postwar era. If some aspects of Rostenkowski's approach to politics had come to seem anachronistic or worse (calling Ways and Means the "Cadillac" committee, conducting business over red meat and gin at Morton's, putting people on his office payroll who tended to personal matters or did little work at all) others proved surprisingly effective in the postreform House. The inattentiveness of so many other members to the hard work of coalition building and the practices that foster and sustain organizational solidarity made Rostenkowski's knowledge and skill in these areas highly valuable assets to his party and to the House as an institution. As Cohen documents, Rostenkowski's efforts were central to any number of major congressional decisions in the areas of tax, budget, trade, and social welfare policy during the 1980s and 1990s. Some of the legislative episodes Cohen