The Academy of Political Science

475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274

(212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@psqonline.org · http://www.psqonline.org

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 115 · Number 1 · Spring 2000

No part of this article may be copied, downloaded, stored, further transmitted, transferred, distributed, altered, or otherwise used, in any form or by any means, except:

- one stored electronic and one paper copy of any article solely for your personal, non-commercial use, or
- with prior written permission of The Academy of Political Science.

Political Science Quarterly is published by The Academy of Political Science. Contact the Academy for further permission regarding the use of this work.

Political Science Quarterly
Copyright © 2000 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

at very low force levels, facilities storing de-alerted weapons would become tempting targets.

Second, when suggesting that Russians might launch their strategic forces on ambiguous warning of missile attack, Feiveson and his colleagues never explain what the Russians might hope to gain from this strategy. By saving the vulnerable portions of their strategic forces from possible destruction, they guarantee the destruction of Russia. A launch on warning strategy might make sense if Russian leaders thought they needed to deter a desperate opponent hell bent on aggression, but they will not find that opponent in the United States.

Third, Feiveson advocates an extensive and intrusive plan to achieve near nuclear disarmament, but this type of formal arms control now appears better suited to the glacial tempo of cold-war diplomacy. Today, the provisions of START II create a floor, not a ceiling, for Russian nuclear forces and a source of financial hardship and political consternation in the Russian Duma. It also is no longer clear why the Russian-American nuclear balance must be based on parity. Why must Russians and Americans only undertake negotiated reductions of their nuclear arsenals when unilateral initiatives and consultations provide more political, military, and financial flexibility?

Fourth, Feiveson and his colleagues never address what might happen if political relations deteriorate as their disarmament plan is implemented. It would be a disaster to discover during a crisis that de-alerting and disarming produced force ratios that gave one or both sides an incentive to use nuclear weapons first in a brewing conflict. The risk of crisis instability increases as forces are placed into storage and only a few weapons remain operational. Under these circumstances, "cheating" might yield significant strategic advantages.

As nuclear abolitionists, Feiveson and his colleagues minimize progress in reducing the threat posed by cold-war legacy systems and new chemical, biological, and nuclear threats that are emerging globally. Instead, they offer a considered plan and a heartfelt plea for virtual nuclear disarmament. Politically, their plan is unrealistic, a fact that is recognized by several contributors to the volume. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and renewed U.S. interest in national missile defense suggest the heretical idea that complex disarmament schemes are ill suited to today's strategic challenges.

JAMES J. WIRTZ
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil *by Scott P. Mainwaring. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999. 390 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.95.*

This splendid book describes and explains the characteristics of Brazil's political party system in comparative context. It also provokes a reexamination of the

comparative study of parties more generally. Mainwaring notes that scholars of party systems often assume a fairly high level of institutionalization. This theoretically conscious analysis of Brazil's party system through the second half of the twentieth century argues, in contrast, that Brazil and many other countries that democratized in the last quarter of the twentieth century have weakly institutionalized party systems. Patterns of party competition are unstable; the parties have weak roots in society and do not respond to, or reflect, its social cleavages; parties are held in low regard and typically possess weak internal organization.

Mainwaring demonstrates impressively that Brazil's political party system is weakly institutionalized by comparative standards, and less institutionalized since 1985 than between 1945 and the 1964 military coup. Brazil's parties appear and disappear with surprising speed. The two largest parties operating before that coup no longer existed when a civilian returned to the presidency in 1985. In the second half of the 1980s, about 40 percent of the members of Congress switched party membership during one congressional term; in the first half of the 1990s, the proportion of party switchers rose to half the members of Congress.

Mainwaring comprehensively explains the low institutionalization of Brazil's party system in two ways. One is a long-term macrohistorical explanation. Brazil (as many recently democratizing countries) is a late industrializer, relying on capital-intensive development; the size of its industrial working class, never large, was at its peak just about half the size of the working class in Western European countries in the 1960s. Brazil never developed large mass-based, disciplined working class parties that might have induced fear and comparable discipline on nonsocialist parties. The Brazilian state, moreover, proactively imposed patterns of corporatist representation (weakening recently) that long short-circuited much of the political work that parties perform in other countries.

Mainwaring's second persuasive explanation is the insidious effect of Brazil's electoral laws on its party system. Brazil's open-list, high-district magnitude proportional representation electoral law maximizes the likelihood that party candidates will court a personal following in often-fierce competition with other candidates from the same party. Incumbents have an automatic right to reappear on the ballot even if they switched parties during the preceding term or never voted with their party's majority. Brazil's highly decentralized political system also decentralized its parties, giving strong incentives for region-based pork-barrel politics that shape nonideological, catch-all parties.

One doubt emerges from this rich and detailed analysis. Why is Brazilian party discipline in Congress so high? Mainwaring asserts the opposite: "it is clear that Brazil's catch-all parties lack discipline" (p. 140). And yet, in 221 roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies in which at least 10 percent of those who voted opposed the winning side, voting discipline was above 85 percent for every party. True, this is lower than in other democracies, but the reader by this

point in the book expects less discipline. Mainwaring does not account well for a level of discipline that seems high given the party system he has described. Moreover, Mainwaring spends considerable time assessing the impact of federalist decentralization on the party system, but there is never a comparative study of the party systems of Brazilian states. A better book would have demonstrated that the argument holds not just at the all-Brazilian level but also, in stylized fashion perhaps, for state-level party systems.

This book will become the key reference in future studies of Brazil's party system. It should also influence a rethinking of the comparative and theoretical work on party systems outside the North Atlantic countries to better understand the challenges that face countries of recent democratization.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War
by Matthew Evangelista. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999. 406 pp. $39.95.

At the core of this book lies a thesis deeply unsettling for conventional explanations of the cold war and its end: in terms of its professed aims of moderating Soviet conduct, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was a resounding failure. Moreover, although it never succeeded in achieving its stated objective, on a number of important occasions U.S. policy induced the very results that it putatively sought to prevent. On the basis of a tightly constructed argument drawing on an impressive store of information assembled from Soviet archives—as well as from the memoirs of and interviews with key participants—Matthew Evangelista has documented the critical role played in this respect by an alliance of scientists, East and West, that emerged in the post-Stalin era and eventually persuaded the Soviet leadership to halt the arms race and terminate the cold war.

The protagonist in Evangelista's story is transnationalism, a phenomenon that contradicts the assumptions of the dominant realist school of international relations and accordingly is completely ignored by its practitioners. Transnationalism here takes the form of collaborative efforts begun in 1955 with the Bertrand Russell/Albert Einstein Manifesto to ban the bomb, leading to the Pugwash movement in which scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain met regularly to exchange ideas and information, attempting to persuade their respective governments to abandon militarism and seek common solutions to the nuclear threat. By the 1980s a number of similar transnational organizations had emerged, developing an alternative conceptualization on national security that formed the basis for Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the radical