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interventionism, which Halberstam sees as concealing a clash of personalities and policies that often prevented Americans from seizing post-cold war opportunities to help create a better world order.

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The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies *by Dennis Kux. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 470 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.95.*

The incredible thing about U.S.–Pakistan relations is that it keeps coming back. In June 2001, Pakistan was just another nuisance to Washington. The Bush administration was looking to build a new relationship with India, even at the cost of relations with Pakistan. President Bill Clinton's *yatra* (journey) to the region in 2000 featured five glorious days in India and five gloomy hours in Islamabad. September 11 altered the calculations one more time.

Each time Pakistan has been abandoned by the United States, geopolitics has forced American attention back to it. The last "upisode" in relations was prompted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan received billions of dollars of American military and economic assistance (much of it destined for the Afghan *mujahidin*), support for its sterile military dictatorship, and a wink on nuclear proliferation. It was also a period that sowed the seeds of radical Islamic terrorism. Following Soviet withdrawal and disintegration, Pakistan returned to Washington's list of mild headaches.

In his comprehensive history of U.S.–Pakistan relations, Dennis Kux captures the essence of this seesaw ride. When freedom arrived in the subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan's leaders quickly recognized the importance of having a solid relationship with the United States, but were rebuffed by the Truman administration, which preferred the promise of a secular India over the reality of a religion-driven Pakistan. Kux writes of U.S. diplomats stationed in the region being repeatedly overruled by Washington on more favorable American policy toward Pakistan.

During the Eisenhower presidency, with the cold war under way, Washington switched gears to make Pakistan "America's most allied ally in Asia" and initiated a program of military assistance. By this time, the country had experienced its first military coup, but it hardly mattered: Ike, as Kux writes, liked Ayub (Khan, Pakistan's then-president and coup leader).

The Democratic administrations that followed, however, preferred India's vibrant, model Third World democracy over Pakistan's military dictatorship. Though Ayub managed to impress the Kennedys more than Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during their respective visits to Washington, the arc of history pointed away from Pakistan. In 1965, as Pakistan fought a war with In-

dia, President Lyndon Johnson stopped the shipment of weapons and military supplies to both countries. The move hurt Pakistan more (it was more dependent on American military supplies) and originated Pakistani distrust of American friendship. The following decade saw a similar pattern: the Nixon–Kissinger plan to open China was sealed through the good offices of Pakistan, but was followed by a low point under the Carter presidency. Had the Soviets not invaded Afghanistan in 1980, U.S.–Pakistan relations might not have recovered.

If the United States is going to be engaged in the region—particularly with Pakistan—for the long term, this involvement has to be both stable and stabilizing. Kux explains the seesaw ride in President Zia-ul Haq's shrewd observation that Pakistan and the United States were in a "union of unequals" (p. 361), which meant that one had global interests, while the other was limited to its neighborhood. The lessons of Kux's book should help reconcile these unmatched grand strategic perspectives and enable a more lasting relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

Kux has a long association with the region, first as a foreign service officer and, following his retirement, as a remarkable diplomatic historian. *Disenchanted Allies* complements his accompanying volume on U.S.–India relations (*Estranged Democracies*, 1993). Together, the two constitute a body of work that will continue to inform policy makers and provide valuable historical material for political scientists seeking explanations for what makes and unmakes relationships between "unequal" countries.

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The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia *by Alan Collins. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 237 pp. $46.50.*

This book raises questions about the nature of security relations in the major areas of Southeast Asia while effectively demonstrating the limited utility of the security dilemma in the Southeast Asian context. As such, it is a valuable contribution to the literature on the region. Collins takes a refreshingly balanced view of emerging China, a welcome contrast to the many recent alarmist analyses on this question. However, he fails to develop some of the theoretical implications of his argument.

According to Collins: "(t)he security dilemma describes a situation in which war can occur between two or more participants where none of those involved desired such an outcome" (p. 3). In an anarchical international environment, states provide their own security. If one state increases its military power, other states must match this increase to ensure their own security. This dynamic