The Academy of Political Science

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 113 · Number 3 · Fall 1998

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Political Science Quarterly
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The study then turns to applying the theoretical arguments to five case studies of foreign military intervention. These are two low risk cases—U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989; one moderate risk case—Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968; and two high-risk cases—U.S. intervention in Vietnam 1964-1968 and Israel's intervention in Lebanon in 1982-1983. The cases are well selected. The methodology of process tracing is ideally suited for understanding the complex decision processes that led to these interventions. The latter two interventions were failures, unlike the first three, which the author terms as successful. His findings point out the conditions under which some interventions remain short and successful and others are protracted conflicts and failures.

One general criticism is that the book is unnecessarily lengthy. Although useful, both the literature review and the case study sections are voluminous and could have been succinctly written in fewer pages. Despite this criticism, the book could be of much use to scholars interested in decision making and policy makers attempting to improve their own decision-making capabilities. This book certainly shows that psychological approaches to understanding security behavior can be fruitfully developed beyond past works on deterrence theory.

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American Foreign Policy: Consensus at Home, Leadership Abroad *by Karl Von Vorys. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1997. 392 pp. $59.95.*

This is neither the usual chronological analysis of recent U.S. foreign policy nor the usual analysis leading toward a political science model. Instead, Karl Von Vorys, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, is concerned that U.S. officials and, perhaps more importantly, the American people will pull back now that the cold war's grave dangers have ebbed and revert to a pick-and-choose isolationism. Or, and one has the feeling this especially worries the author, Americans will limit their attention, guarantees of security, and benefits of the dollar to fellow westerners. The danger, in other words, comes less from Herbert Hoover's ghost than political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's presence. For as Von Vorys quotes him, Huntington argues that "western leaders" must "preserve and renew the unique qualities of western civilization. . . . Neither globalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism will serve American interests" (p. 321).

Von Vorys attacks this argument from two general directions. He first notes that not only is the U.S. population becoming less "western" and waspish, but that as it includes more Asian-Americans and Hispanic-Americans, as African-Americans exert more pressure on Washington, and as the many profitseeking Americans focus on the potential of Asia, "strictly speaking ours is no longer a western civilization, not even the American phase of western civilization" (p. 322). Second, the author ranges widely to analyze U.S. overseas policy to demonstrate how Washington officials learned from interwar and other disasters to establish a post-1945 decentralized world order. After this quest's success was partly short-circuited by the Vietnam War, Washington played a kind of balance-of-power game, aided by new technology, to bring down the Soviet Union.

The argument for U.S. global leadership is buttressed by a useful series of historical analyses examining, among other episodes and not in chronological order, the Gulf War, the

development of the U.S. security system, the creation of the Munich syndrome, the debate and negotiations over German unification in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the evolution of Latin America's political economy. Most of these depend on secondary sources. A notable exception is the section on Europe at the end of the cold war. Most also stress security and politics. The Latin American section is interesting for its tracing of economic themes climaxing in the North American Free Trade structure.

Oddly missing, given the early emphasis on tensions between U.S. domestic demands and the demands made abroad on Washington's policies, is any extended analysis of how American leaders shaped domestic views and interests to support global policies in the 1940s and 1950s. There is nothing, for example, on the Truman Doctrine, which set up a forty-year consensus for fighting the cold war. The thesis is challenging, the vignettes supporting the thesis are readable, but the argument's indispensable domestic dimension is largely assumed rather than analyzed.

WALTER LAFEBER
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Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy *by Peter Trubowitz. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 353 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

Peter Trubowitz has written an important book that adds much to our understanding of how U.S. foreign policy has developed over the last century. Trubowitz focuses on how domestic regional and sectional politics configured U.S. foreign policy, taking a multidisciplinary approach to make his case that not only depends on traditional political science, but also on the disciplines and subdisciplines of history, geography, international relations, and American political development. The result is a rich narrative that parsimoniously unites different theoretical approaches in its analysis of U.S. foreign policy.

For those interested in American political development, *Defining the National Interest* is one of a set of new books that views U.S. external policy as fundamentally linked to domestic policy planning. Trubowitz makes a very important critical argument: in the case of the United States, there is no single "national interest" and there never was a single "overarching" definable national interest that drove foreign-policy planning. This view works against "outside-in" realist theory, which holds that external changing security dilemmas are what define a nation-state's national interest. Trubowitz's analysis focuses on the "interpenetration" of internal and external policy making. In the author's view, the U.S. "national interest" has always been malleable, contingent on domestic politics and specifically defined in terms of regional political economy. Following this foundational premise, regional political economy and the power distribution (coalitions) in Congress are what determine grand strategic policy. Trubowitz examines three important periods in the last century of U.S. foreign policy: the 1890s, in which seapower and imperialism are examined; a "long" 1930s, in which international interests are analyzed; and finally the 1980s, where a "resurgent America" is analyzed. In all three periods, Trubowitz is able to show how sectional politics fundamentally configured grand strategy.

The longest and most challenging chapter is an expanded investigation of the long 1930s: a careful analysis of the interwar years, World War II, and an all-too-short side glance at