Nearly three decades after Paul Pierson observed that the politics of policy retrenchment differs in consequential ways from the politics of policy enactment, legislative scholars are taking notice. In their incisive new book, Congress in Reverse, Jordan M. Ragusa and Nathaniel A. Birkhead argue that efforts by lawmakers to repeal existing laws are different from the votes they take to pass new ones. Drawing on ideas that will be familiar to historical institutionalists and legislative scholars, the authors identify two reasons why this is so. First, efforts to repeal existing laws often run aground because lawmakers cannot deflect those interest groups determined to maintain the status quo. Second, repeals are tempting to pursue—but difficult to execute—because they can burnish the repealing party's brand and tarnish that of its opponents. On this account, repeal efforts are yet another way for members of a newly made majority party to quickly deliver tangible legislative victories to voters and to differentiate themselves from the bums so recently thrown out.

In service of these arguments, Ragusa and Birkhead devote considerable energy to identifying repeal bills and distinguishing them from other types of legislation. As they note, some repeals are perfunctory—a necessary step in updating outdated or inconsistent statutory lang