For generations, scholars have debated the appropriate scope and limits of U.S. presidential power. There are at least two competing schools of thought. One school includes scholars such as Louis Fisher who believe that presidents have largely broken free from the rule of law, abetted by Congress and the courts. Another school includes scholars such as John Yoo who believe that the president can set aside laws designed to put limits on executive power. Scholars in both schools usually have an opinion as to whether presidential power unchecked by law is desirable: those in the first school see this as incompatible with the Madisonian system of checks and balances, while those in the second school see it as something to be embraced.

In The Myth of the Imperial Presidency, Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner suggest another way of considering questions involving presidential power. Christenson and Kriner agree with the Fisher school that formal Madisonian checks have “all but collapsed in the face of an ascendant presidential juggernaut” (p. 5). However, they conclude that unilateral presidential power is not “unfettered,” it is just that “the most important check on presidential unila