pp. 133-155
Strategic Bargaining in Brazil's Debt Negotiations
Howard P. Lehman discusses the critical debt rescheduling agreement between Brazil and its international creditors by using a modified model of strategic interaction. He concludes that each side has significant power resources that shape the final debt agreement and that this model is more accurate than a rigid game theoretic model.
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Introduction: Black Power and the Civil Rights Agendas of Charles V. Hamilton
Marylena Mantas and Robert Y. Shapiro
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