Giacomo Chiozza's book examines how the strength and legitimacy of United States hegemony is affected by domestic political institutions in its partner states. Chiozza argues that the presence or absence of “regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover” shapes compliance with U.S. policy preferences, and ultimately whether the United States plays the role of “shrewd sheriff” or “bad cop” (2). When incumbents face competition, the United States can use relationships with potential successors and influence over the outcome of leadership transitions as leverage to gain compliance. Where viable successors are lacking, the United States has fewer channels for “shrewd” influence and is more likely to play the role of “bad cop,” by supporting leaders who lack domestic legitimacy or by seeking to overthrow noncompliant regimes. Chiozza argues that the presence of potential successors should also foster political stability, better governance, and respect for human rights, as competition over leadership incentivizes better leadership. “Potential successor theory” thus offers a clear prescription for U.S. foreign policy: encourage domestic political institutions that foster potential successors, and you will have both more compliant partners and a more stable and legitimate U.S. world order (6).