Why is there so little (corporate) money in U.S. politics? Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003)’s provocative question remains relevant today despite transformations that have since occurred in U.S. campaign finance. A common explanation is that investment returns to campaign contributions (and, to a lesser extent, lobbying) must be low—or else firms would have spent a lot more money.

However, this line of thinking neglects numerous constraints that firms face when using money to influence politics and policy-making. In The Cost of Doing Politics, Sumner highlights an important constraint that has received scant attention in political science: the potential for public backlash and tarnished firm reputation. Sumner shows that corporate money in politics–when perceived to conflict with people’s partisanship–attracts unwanted attention and calls for boycotts. Firms are keenly aware of the risks of such public backlash and are especially hesitant to engage in money in politics when their reputation is at stake. This consequently shifts corporate influence-seeking to less scrutinized, partisan, or controversial avenues, such as intermediaries (e.g., industry and trade associations, think tanks, grassroots mobilization) or philanthropy. In developing her theoretical framework, Sumner engages with related research from